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ill Ferguson’s 419 is a novel concerned with the relationship 
between the local and the global; specifically, the text follows 
the particularities of individual lives that implicate one another 
across a vast geographical range. Over the course of the novel, the fates of 
these individual lives intertwine in ways that are unprecedented outside of 
the era of globalization, calling into question received understandings of 
difference and responsibility. This act of questioning manifests itself in the 
novel’s construction of the fraught relationship between law and ethics. 
Winston, an internet scammer, is not immune to feelings of cognitive 
dissonance arising from the ethical problem his scamming poses; 
ironically, it is the legal loophole within section 419 of the Nigerian 
criminal code that allows him to engage in the act of scamming, and he 
opportunistically makes use of the letter of the law to justify his criminal 
behaviour. The relationship between the law and criminality put forth by 
the novel, a relationship so intimate that it is the very law it violates that 
gives the 419 scam its name, raises many questions about the connection 
between the law and ethics in the era of globalization, and its broader 
connections to the shifting sense of responsibility brought about by 
changes to time and space at the beginning of the twenty-first century: 
what is the relationship between law and lawlessness? Whom does the law 
exclude from protection? And perhaps most importantly, given the novel’s 
global reach, how might the law function to sanction or justify abuses 
toward a distant Other? 
 Useful to answering these questions is the work of Giorgio 
Agamben, Achille Mbembe, and Simon Springer, whose writings on the 
type of “zones of non-responsibility” (Homo sacer 21) that allow large-scale 
human rights violations to take place may be brought to bear on the types 
of abuses present in Ferguson’s text. The rootedness of the 419 scam 
within the letter of the law; the inhabitants of the Niger River Delta and 
their exclusion from protection against exploitation by foreign oil 
companies; and the secondary characters of Ambrose Littlechild, a drifter 
with “no fixed address,” and a refugee known only as Amina: all of these 
elements of the text support Agamben’s assertion that the law creates the 
conditions of its own suspension, and that by this “state of exception” 
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(Homo sacer 168) it justifies abuses toward a distant Other who is granted 
existence only by virtue of his/her exclusion from the law. Within this 
framework, Winston’s manipulation of Nigerian law to enact the 419 scam 
constitutes an opportunistic retaliation against the state of exception. 
Taken together, the interconnections between these local narratives reflect 
a global system of exchange that brings previously distinct zones of non-
responsibility into proximity in a way that forces an acknowledgement by 
those who come under the law’s protection of those who do not.  
Where the law is present in 419, it is most often being breached, 
manipulated, or ignored. Whether it is Laura, who seeks legal help in 
solving the case of her father’s death but later takes the law into her own 
hands when she learns he has been made the victim of the 419 scam; 
Winston, who capitalizes on legal loopholes to conduct criminal activity; 
or Nnamdi, whose home and people are victimized by exploitative and 
technically illegal labour practices, the relationship Ferguson’s characters 
hold to the law reflects themes in recent political theory, most notably the 
work of Giorgio Agamben, whose work centres on how abuses perpetrated 
by the sovereign power toward certain groups come to be sanctioned by 
law. While Agamben deals primarily with theorizing of the Holocaust, his 
writings are nonetheless relevant to a reading of 419, whose characters 
undergo abuses that may be read as simply the latest manifestation of the 
law’s involvement in state violence. Agamben argues that the law exists not 
to bring criminals to justice, or to defend the rights of the weak, but 
rather, at its core, only in order to articulate what he calls zones of non-
responsibility. One cannot write a law into being without simultaneously 
creating a state of exception in which that law will not apply; for example, 
to state, in law, that certain rights will be extended to all citizens of a 
particular state tacitly articulates a space in which those deemed to be non-
citizens may be stripped of these rights. The horror of events like the 
Holocaust lies not in its exceptional violence, but rather in the way such 
violence is rendered commonplace by its legal codification. Though the 
Holocaust may seem far removed from the contemporary Canadian and 
Nigerian locales that feature in Ferguson’s novel, Agamben’s questioning 
of the presumed link between law and ethics is nonetheless relevant to the 
types of abuses that take place in 419, most notably the sustained 
environmental and human exploitation taking place along the Niger River 
Delta by Western oil companies. For Agamben, no such link exists, except 
to describe how the law can and frequently does intrude upon our code of 
ethical behaviour; it is this intrusion that underpins the abuses suffered by 
the novel’s characters, both in Nigeria and in Canada. 
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 The central figure of Agamben’s argument is the individual he 
names homo sacer: he who is excluded from the law’s protection and toward 
whom the state of exception sanctions the sovereign power’s worst abuses. 
Originally signifying an obscure figure of archaic Roman law, homo sacer in 
Agamben’s appropriation of the term refers to one whom the state does 
not recognize, and who is thus effectively stripped of his/her political 
identity (i.e., human rights) and reduced to his/her “bare” or animal life 
(Homo sacer 4). The homo sacer is included in the juridical order only by 
virtue of his exclusion. Agamben writes, “At once excluding bare life from 
and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually 
constitute[s], in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the 
entire political system rest[s]” (Homo sacer 19). Agamben concludes that it 
is this state of exception that “allows for the foundation and definition of 
the normal legal order” (Remnants 48). This idea has widespread 
implications beyond the Holocaust; Achille Mbembe’s postcolonial 
application of Agamben is especially pertinent to a reading of 419 and the 
issues the novel raises. For Mbembe, it is law’s very capacity to give rise to 
the state of exception that allows the sovereign power to imagine “the 
inhumanity of, or rule over, foreign peoples” (Mbembe 157). Whereas for 
Agamben the concentration camp is the spatial embodiment of the state-
of-exception-become-rule, for Mbembe, it is the colony, which, he states, 
“represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the 
exercise of a power outside the law (ab legibus solutus) and where ‘peace’ is 
more likely to take on the face of a ‘war without end’” (162). Put 
differently, for both Agamben and Mbembe, the idea of a link between law 
and ethics is a misplaced one; rather, the law creates the conditions of its 
own suspension, which allows for abuses toward those who are only 
included in the juridical system by virtue of their exclusion. As 
demonstrated by 419, the zone of non-responsibility that the law creates is 
not just symbolic but has a material existence: indeed, its existence 
depends upon the creation of literal spaces of non-responsibility that are 
foregrounded and contested within Ferguson’s text. 
 In 419, space functions as an embodiment of the state of 
exception in which neocolonial power is exercised toward the novel’s 
Nigerian characters, who come to embody Agamben’s homo sacer: one who 
is forcibly reduced to bare life via lack of juridical recognition. Though the 
novel is set in a postcolonial environment, the aftermath of colonialism, 
manifested through neoliberal exploitation, is still very much present. In 
“Neoliberalising violence: of the exceptional and the exemplary in 
coalescing moments,” Simon Springer writes that neoliberalism’s focus on 
economic growth is “inextricably bound” (137) to violence, and that “the 
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hegemony of neoliberalism positions it as an abuser, which actively 
facilitates the abandonment of ‘Others’ who fall outside of ‘neoliberal 
normativity’” (137). Neoliberalism has a homogenizing effect on global 
geographies that reduces individuals to their capacity as labourers. The 
abandonment of Others (those falling outside of this capacity) produces “a 
relation of inclusive-exclusion” that “aligns it with sovereign power” (140). 
Springer argues that the systemic violence perpetrated against those who 
fall outside of neoliberal normativity (i.e., the creation of conditions that 
necessitate the turn toward illegal activity or forced migration) 
metamorphoses from exceptional to exemplary, as “aversion for alterity 
intensifies under neoliberalism and its associated violence against ‘Others’ 
comes to form the rule” (136). In this way, neoliberalism functions as a 
contemporary example of the normalization of Agamben’s state of 
exception.  
 Since, as David Harvey writes, “command over spaces and times is 
a crucial element in any search for profit” (226), the creation of a space of 
exception allowing for unfettered exploitation is crucial to neoliberal gain; 
as shown in the drilling of the Niger River Delta by Western oil compa-
nies, neoliberalism and sovereign power coalesce in the space of the oil 
field, which, because of its geographical distance from the sovereign power 
(in this case, the West), lies outside of the law’s protection. A conversation 
between Nnamdi, an Ijaw fisherman and resident of the Delta, and an oil 
company employee reveals that these oil companies are operating within a 
zone of non-responsibility outside of the law’s protection: “‘In Europe and 
in America, where I’m from, they have tough laws about environmental 
stuff.’ The instructor laughed. ‘We could never do there what we do 
here.’” (186). What is unlawful in one’s home state is rendered lawful in 
the foreign one. Here the oilfield fits Mbembe’s description of colonial 
space as an embodiment of the state of exception, in which the individual 
is treated “as if he or she no longer existed except as a mere tool and in-
strument of production” (161). In the Niger Delta it is the Western oil 
companies that constitute the new colonial presence and which make the 
oilfields into “the location par excellence where the violence of the state of 
exception is deemed to operate in the service of ‘civilisation’” (163). In the 
context of late capitalism it is profit that comes to replace civilisation as 
central project of the colonial power, enacting what Mbembe calls “the 
generalised instrumentalization of human existence and the material de-
struction of human bodies and populations” (154). 
 The liminal spaces occupied by individuals whose lives are 
instrumentalized by the state of exception reflect their marginalization. 
Like Agamben’s homo sacer, those employed at the drilling site are stripped 
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of their political identity and reduced to bare life. As Nnamdi describes, 
“they were all Shell Men; it didn’t matter whether they were oyibos or Igbo, 
and it didn’t matter what the colour of their coveralls was or which 
particular tribal markings were sewn onto their chest pockets: Chevron, 
Texaco, Mobil, Agip, BP, Exxon. Total from France, Eni and Saipem from 
Italy. Even the NNPC, Nigeria’s own National Petroleum Corporation. It 
was all Shell” (Ferguson 178). Regardless of race or nationality, in the 
neoliberal state of exception in which all forms of Otherness are 
subordinated to economic growth, each is reduced to his capacity as 
labourer. The erasure that this exploitation enacts upon all forms of 
Otherness manifests itself in the liminal spaces that those living along the 
oil companies’ “Road to Nowhere” (176) are forced to inhabit. The 
unlawful-yet-lawful exploitation of the Niger River Delta makes its 
inhabitants into what Mbembe calls the “living dead” within a 
necropolitical order in which life is subjugated to the power of death 
(177). Echoing this notion, Nnamdi, upon coming across a village 
decimated by the Nigerian government in response to civilian attacks on 
an oil pipeline, muses, “The teme of the childless and of those lost between 
wombs were said to inhabit the Village of the Dead after their passing. Is 
that what this was? A graveyard of lost souls?” (Ferguson 193). Here 
Nnamdi equates the village’s inhabitants with the “woeful ghost” or 
“outcast” (166) of Ijaw myth. Nnamdi himself also occupies a liminal 
space: as the narrator reveals, “There were times when Nnamdi scarcely 
seemed tethered to this world” (175). Nnamdi’s existence is suspended in a 
state somewhere between life and death in a way that places him among 
the “living dead” Mbembe identifies. Upon meeting Amina in the desert 
after he is forced to flee the violence erupting in the Delta between the oil 
companies and the villagers who rise up to contest their exploitation, 
Nnamdi is recognized by Amina as an inhabitant of the Delta by “the dark 
sheen of oil” coating his face “as though it had soaked into his skin” (233). 
This covering is the mark of the oil companies’ imposition of neoliberal 
normativity onto Nnamdi: the coating of oil extracted from the exploited 
land symbolizes an attempt to normalize his Otherness by rendering him 
into an exploitable, dehumanized extension of the land itself. His body 
bears the marks of his exclusion from the juridical order through the 
reduction of his identity to his bare capacity as tool of production. The 
liminal position occupied by Nnamdi and others affected by the oil 
drilling operation reflects their marginal position (outside the protection 
of the law) and the stripping away of their political identity. For Nnamdi 
and the other inhabitants of the Delta, this marginalization is the result of 
their geographical separation from the sovereign power. But the homo sacer 
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need not be denied protection of the law strictly by virtue of his or her 
distance from the sovereign state; the state of exception can just as easily 
exclude individuals within a given state if their exclusion allows for an 
increase in the state’s ability to exercise its sovereign power, as reflected in 
the cases of two secondary characters: Amina and Ambrose Littlechild. 
 Amina is an individual marked for exclusion from the juridical 
order by virtue of her failure to conform to neoliberal normativity. One of 
the first impressions of Amina, a placeless refugee who for undisclosed 
reasons must flee the Sahel desert and avoid detection, is of a woman “fol-
lowing bone-ribbed cattle down to a swampy pond where she refilled her 
jerry can” (77). This vivid image of a woman reduced to being just one 
more member of a herd of cattle suggests that Amina, like Nnamdi, has 
been reduced to bare or animal life. Amina comes from a tribe of Sahel 
desert nomads who, she recalls her father telling her, are “not Nigerians,” 
but “something else” (81). While the reasons for Amina’s desert flight are 
never made explicit, Ferguson suggests that it is tied to the ongoing mar-
ginalization of her people: a tribe whose recent fall in status from horse-
men to herdsmen is only the latest manifestation of such marginalization. 
Amina recalls a song, handed down over generations, singing, “If we are 
destined to disappear, we are destined to disappear . . . But if so, we will go 
with our swords drawn” (88). That these are the songs of Amina’s people 
reflects the degree to which exclusion has, historically, formed the basis of 
their cultural identity.  
 The exclusion of Amina and her people from the juridical order 
has a distinct spatial quality that is reminiscent of that of Nnamdi and his 
fellow villagers. “You have contained us; you have not conquered us” (75), the 
battle cry of Amina’s tribe, embodies the degree to which the denial of the 
Sahel clan’s political existence is tied to physical displacement. Traditional-
ly, this has meant relegation to the desert itself, something the tribe has 
used opportunistically to its advantage:  
 
‘We were ambush traders’ was how they liked to describe 
it, eyes smiling. Ambush traders lying in wait for Arab 
camel drivers and Tuareg salt traders. ‘We negotiated with 
swords drawn.’ Caliphates and sultans were forced to 
kneel, emirs to bow down. Even the Seven Kingdoms of 
the Hausa had not been able to subdue them. Whenever 
armies moved against them, her clan would simply melt 
back into the Sahel. (87) 
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The seeming ability to become part of the land itself places the tribe in 
opposition with Nnamdi and his covering of oil; here the tribe uses their 
outsider position to their advantage in order to escape the detection of 
government forces. In present-day Nigeria, however, it seems that the posi-
tion Amina occupies in relation to the desert is far more precarious; she is 
sorely lacking in food and water, and her descriptions of the “swaths of 
failed crops,” “soil grown too sandy for millet,” and “sparse grasses barely 
enough to support base grazing” (77) suggest that, like Nnamdi, Amina 
occupies her current position as a result of large-scale environmental ex-
ploitation that is likely tied to the Western oil trade. That the water inside 
Amina’s jerry can “still taste[s] of gasoline” (77) no matter how many times 
she has rinsed it out reinforces the connection between Amina’s position 
as homo sacer and the exploitative oil trade. 
 As one who falls outside of neoliberal normativity, Amina is at 
risk of total erasure by neoliberal violence, this time in the form of literal 
extinction. For Amina this erasure takes the form of symbolic association 
with the desert, which engulfs the surrounding land as a direct conse-
quence of environmental degradation that is likely caused by the same oil 
drilling that pollutes the Niger Delta. Amina is continually associated with 
the swirling desert sand and is described as walking herself “in and out of 
dust” (79) which coats her from head to toe: “When a sudden gust—as hot 
and dry as camel’s breath—threw itself against her, it was the Sahara itself 
that gritted her eyes, made her cough. Trace elements of that encroaching 
desert, it collected like salt rind in her tear ducts” (76). Like Nnamdi, 
whose metaphorical coating in oil represents his reduction to bare life, 
Amina’s dusting with desert sand signifies her liminal position as one on 
the brink of disappearance under neoliberalism’s widespread banishment 
of Others. 
 Though he features far less prominently in the novel than Amina, 
the character of Ambrose Littlechild may be read as Amina’s Canadian 
counterpart and offers further evidence to support the contention that the 
banishment of Others need not rely on a wide geographical distance 
between the laws of the sovereign state and those they exclude. Despite 
living within one of the centres of Western oil production, Ambrose is just 
as excluded by the neoliberal pursuit of economic growth as Amina. Like 
her, Ambrose is victimized on account of his failure to conform to 
neoliberal normativity, only this time he is entirely erased from the 
narrative. And like Amina, next to nothing is known about his 
background, save for what is revealed by the police report filed upon the 
discovery of his still-living body, the victim of immolation by local college 
students: “No fixed address. Originally a resident of Fort McMurray. 
Journal of Student Writing Number 36  
Known to police. A panhandler, bottle picker” (209). Ambrose's 
homelessness targets him for this act of seemingly exceptional violence, 
though, as evinced by the reaction of Sergeant Brisebois and the other 
police officers, such acts are in fact far more exemplary than is at first 
apparent: “‘Better call in homicide,’ Brisebois had said, even as EMS 
attended to the victim” (209). Brisebois is eager to pass Littlechild’s case 
through the legal system as quickly as possible so as to effectively forget its 
existence. The reaction of the other officers, who suggest going out for 
drinks, further emphasizes that Ambrose’s death is business-as-usual. 
Brisebois’ blasé response, “‘No, you go. I have to swing by 7-Eleven, pick 
up some cat food. It’s been a long day’” (210), divests the entire crime of 
any emotion, and highlights the apathy and lack of recognition of 
Littlechild by the state. Strangely, what does seems to merit attention is the 
lack of credibility of the witnesses to the crime, who are dismissed as “mad, 
rambling, and unreliable; street people like Ambrose” (209). In this way, 
Ambrose’s death is turned into an event without a witness, and without 
blame, while his existence is reduced to “the reverse silhouette that had 
been burned onto the flattened cardboard of an alleyway bed: the 
blackened surface leaving the pale outline of where the body had been 
lying in a fetal position” (209): in short, the negative space that surrounds 
his body, which, by virtue of its lack of economic productivity, must be 
eliminated. 
 If the Niger River Delta, the Sahel desert, and the back alleys of an 
unnamed Canadian city may be understood as spatial embodiments of the 
state of exception-become-rule in which neoliberal abuses are justified, 
then the city of Lagos may be read as a space of opportunistic retaliation 
against the necropolitical order. The text constructs the urban spaces of 
Nigeria as “exceptional” in their relative wealth compared to the rural vil-
lages of the Delta. In the meeting between Laura and Winston’s parents, 
Winston’s father emphasizes that the city of Lagos “‘was never colonized. 
This was British territory, under the dominion of the British monarch. We 
had the same rights as British citizens. The rest of Nigeria may have been 
conquered and cobbled together, but not us. Sometimes I think we should 
separate, create our own city state’” (338). However, the narrator suggests 
that Nigeria’s urban spaces occupy this relatively privileged position 
through state-sanctioned violence against Others. As Nnamdi’s travelling 
companion “Igbo Joe” asks, in reference to the capital city of Abuja, “‘Did 
you know . . . when slums appear in Abuja, the government bulldozes 
them down to keep things pretty? An honest man does not have a fighting 
chance here’” (304). Springer calls neoliberalism “a system that most assur-
edly creates winners and losers” (140), and Igbo Joe’s description of Abuja 
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highlights the way in which urban spaces carry the potential to both up-
hold and contest the neoliberal state of exception. Winston, who, as a res-
ident of Lagos, is primarily associated with urban space, takes advantage of 
living in the neoliberal state of exception by manoeuvring within the con-
fines of the Nigerian legal code in order to carry out the 419 scam against 
those on neoliberalism’s “winning” side.  
 If, as Harvey writes, capitalist control over space may be achieved 
by persuading workers “that space is an open field of play for capital but a 
closed terrain for themselves” (234), then Winston’s involvement in the 
act of internet scamming opens the terrain of virtual space to individuals 
excluded from economic power. Like the Western oil companies allowed 
to drill in the Niger River Delta, the 419 scam is effectively sanctioned by 
law. As ringleader Ironsi-Egobia tells Winston, quoting the Nigerian legal 
code as though it were a sacred text, “Offenders can be arrested without a war-
rant only so long as said offender is found in the act of committing the offense” 
(Ferguson 128). It is the letter of the law that articulates the zone of non-
responsibility that Winston can use to his advantage. The act this law per-
mits is absolutely contrary to Winston’s own system of ethics, as shown by 
his continuous attempts to set himself apart from what he sees as common 
criminals: 
 
Hunter. Fisherman. Entrepreneur. Nollywood director. . . 
Criminals lacked finesse. Criminals bashed people on the 
back of their skulls and looted wallets, rummaged through 
purses. Criminals murdered, but guymen seduced. 
Winston didn’t take the mugus’ money; they gave it to 
him, eyes clouded by greed, dazzled by dollars. And when 
they give you their money, it doesn’t count as stealing. (65) 
 
That the law does not fully succeed in doing away with Winton’s cognitive 
dissonance reinforces Agamben’s assertion that there is no fundamental 
connection between law and ethics, and that the law instead contains with-
in it the capacity to suspend itself in order to justify all sorts of abuses. As 
in the case of the Western oil companies’ exploitation of Ijaw workers, the 
marginalization of Amina, and the violence perpetrated toward Ambrose 
Littlechild, the lawlessness built into the Nigerian legal code also has a spa-
tial element, though in this case it is the virtual aspect of this space and the 
anonymity it affords that allows for the 419 scam to take place. The online 
environment becomes the site of Winston’s exercise of power against indi-
viduals like Laura’s father Henry, who, by virtue of his exclusion from the 
protection of Nigerian law, becomes an analogue of the homo sacer. The 
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text’s first description of Laura’s father comes on page 3, where his body, 
pulled from the wreckage of a fatal car accident, is referred to as “some-
thing that had once been a man.” Like the individuals of the Niger River 
Delta who come to occupy a liminal space on the verge of erasure, Laura’s 
father is reduced to slowly vanishing traces read in the packed snow of the 
accident scene, in bank statements, and on his computer’s memory, emerg-
ing like a “[ghost] from the hard drive. Email after email. Afterimages.  
Trails in the ether” (49). That the 419 scam is largely viewed as retaliation 
against a legacy of injustice sanctioned by the sovereign power is made 
clear when the airport EFCC officer Mr. Ribadu tells Laura upon her arri-
val in Nigeria that “‘[w]hen it comes to obtaining wealth through false pre-
tenses, the white man is still the expert. I’m afraid the black man is an am-
ateur when it comes to 419ing others. One might say, my entire country 
was obtained under false pretenses’” (304). The 419 scam, its intimate 
connection with the law, and its mirroring of the sort of erasure enacted 
by the oil companies’ exploitation ruptures any supposed link between law 
and ethics, and shows the law to be little more than a means of maintain-
ing sovereign power through economic gain. 
 Since Ferguson’s novel is one with an unusually large global reach, 
intertwining Canadian and Nigerian plots and characters in ways that 
seem to mirror each other, it is worth considering what this rupture to the 
relationship between law and ethics in 419 means in a broader discussion 
of space — that is, space on a global scale. While Doreen Massey advocates 
thinking about places as “articulated moments in networks of social rela-
tions” that offer “a sense of place which is extroverted, which includes a 
consciousness of its links with the wider world, which integrates in a posi-
tive way the global and the local” (154), today, when social relations are 
increasingly stretched out over space, the lives of peoples whose exclusion 
by the law may once have taken place out of sight are made to intertwine 
with the lives of those on the “winning side” of neoliberalism, complicat-
ing any attempt at positive integration of the local and the global. While 
ethical responsibility may seem implicit in any consideration of the law 
within a closed system, globalization and the virtualization of social rela-
tions via the internet bring the law into contact with the zones of non-
responsibility on which it depends, foregrounding Agamben’s assertion 
that the concept of responsibility is always in fact “irremediably contami-
nated by law” (Remnants 20). Agamben goes on to argue that “as long as 
the state of exception and the normal situation are kept separate in space 
and time, as is usually the case, both remain opaque, though they secretly 
institute each other. But as soon as they show their complicity, as happens 
more and more often today, they illuminate each other, so to speak, from 
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the inside” (50-51). By intertwining the fates of Winston, Nnamdi, Amina, 
and Laura, Ferguson’s text reflects a global system of exchange that brings 
previously distinct zones of non-responsibility into proximity, in a way that 
illuminates how the state of exception and the normal situation secretly 
institute each other as Agamben describes.  
 One may wonder what is to be learned from a text that seems to 
offer so little by way of redemption: Nnamdi is killed, and Laura returns to 
Canada with a partial repayment of her father’s money only to wire it all 
back to Nigeria to pay for Amina’s passage to Canada, though Amina has 
in fact been pocketing the transfers the entire time. If this is a story of the 
local meeting the global, then none of the outcomes of this encounter 
seem particularly promising. But what the 419 scam as a form of 
retaliation against the state of exception shows is that beneath the 
seemingly unrelenting tides of globalization lie forms of local resistance 
that work against the idea of neoliberalism as a political inevitability. 
Harvey states that “the incentive to create the world market, to reduce 
spatial barriers, and to annihilate space through time is omni-present,” and 
that “innovations dedicated to the removal of spatial barriers . . . have 
been of immense significance in the history of capitalism, turning that 
history into a very geographical affair” (232). By opening virtual space to 
individuals excluded from sovereign power, both Winston’s and Amina’s 
use of the 419 scam brings to light the ways in which the removal of such 
spatial barriers for the purposes of maintaining sovereign power may also 
contain the seeds of resistance against it. The connection thus established 
between these zones of non-responsibility is crucial to building what 
Springer identifies as “conceptual linkages between the violence occurring 
in multiple sites undergoing neoliberalization,” and to identifying “threads 
of commonality within these diverse spaces so that an emancipatory 
agenda of transnational scope may potentially begin to emerge” (136). In 
showing the interconnections among the lives of his Canadian and 
Nigerian characters, Ferguson identifies commonalities between 
geographically disparate individuals that permeate the zones of non-
responsibility upon which the law relies, demonstrating how 
neoliberalization, “inasmuch as it claims a global domain[,] . . .implicates 
all of humanity in a particular ‘moment’, a moment of abandonment 
wherein the social relations that afford privilege to the few and privation 
to the many are the very same social relations that occasion violence” (137, 
emphasis added). In so doing, Ferguson’s novel moves toward opening up 
a space for the kind of emancipatory agenda Springer calls for: one in 
which responsibility is untethered from law and reconfigured as an aspect 
of our common humanity. 
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